On 24 November 2025, the Business and Trade Committee released its report “Toward a new doctrine for economic security”, proposing a central, critical role for the private sector in delivering economic security for the UK.
It benchmarks the UK’s current approach to economic security against the US, EU and Japan, finding the UK approach less coherent or durable. It recommends establishing a principles-based economic security doctrine that applies to the whole of government and requires engagement from the private sector. It also proposes reform of the UK’s National Security and Investment Act (NSIA) to make it an enabler for friendly investment, not only a screening process for investment risk.
How the UK compares to the EU and US today
The report describes the UK approach to economic security as a patchwork of strategies and initiatives, with no single legislative or institutional framework. This makes it susceptible to political churn, weakens coordination and reduces predictability for business. By contrast:
- The US combines a developed screening system (CFIUS) and active enforcement culture with enabling tools to channel “trusted” capital, supply chain derisking (including stockpiles and outbound tools) and large scale incentives to build strategic capacity. These enabling initiatives have been increasing under the current US administration.
- The EU has a clear economic security strategy built on “promote, protect, partner”. Legislation addresses systemic risks (e.g., cyber product security, critical raw materials, anti-coercion) alongside coordinated risk assessments.
A “whole of society” approach
The report recommends that the UK government should adopt a “whole of society “ approach to economic security. Because the UK has an open economy, the private sector is often where economic security shocks will land first and hardest (cyber-attacks, supply chain breakdowns, coercive investment, technology leakage) –there is private ownership of public risk.
The report proposes that the UK government should provide doctrine, institutions, intelligence, incentives and sharper enforcement, while business is expected to invest, share information and engineer resilience into their operations, technology, governance and supply chains.
Lessons from the US / EU – economy-wide
The report recommends a UK doctrine that matches the clarity, structure and instruments seen in the US / EU:
- Governance. The UK should move to a durable, principles-based framework (akin to the EU’s), underpinned by legislation and supported by a dedicated minister and an Office of Economic Security to coordinate policy and private sector engagement.
- Principles-based doctrine. The report proposes the “6D objectives” to shape UK economic security doctrine: diagnose threats early, develop sovereign capabilities, diversify critical supply chains, defend assets and data, deter hostile activity, and dovetail with allied partners and UK industry.
- Supply chains and critical minerals. Drawing from the US, the UK should be proactive in securing supply chains including strategic stockpiles, financing / guarantees for allied supply projects and acceleration of domestic capacity. The report recommends that, drawing on the EU example, the UK should legislate to secure critical minerals, with measurable benchmarks for domestic extraction, processing and recycling, designation of strategic projects and streamlined planning / finance. In the US, the government is very active in investing into key private sector projects, particularly in the critical minerals space, including investments in mining, refining and processing as well as by-product recovery, circular economy initiatives, allied supply-chain partnerships, resource mapping and data tools.
- Cybersecurity and product liability. The UK should have an obligatory “secure by design” regime for software and connected products, as the EU does, plus require mandatory reporting of material malicious cyber incidents. Resilience spend should be made tax efficient.
- Counter-coercion toolkit. There should be stronger UK anti-coercion instruments (as in the EU and US) to boost resilience against the strategic weaponisation of trade. This would include a wider menu of responses (services and investment restrictions, procurement, IP measures) than just goods tariffs or quotas. The EU’s anti-coercion instrument has not yet been used but was partly conceived as a deterrent, with countermeasures a last resort.
- Shared risk picture. Drawing from both the EU and US, there should be regular, declassified threat briefings, joint exercises, and system-level risk assessments of priority technologies and supply chains, coordinated with allies.
Lessons from the US / EU – FDI screening reform
The Committee considers the UK’s NSIA to be central to the 6D’s “defend” objective, but wants it also to be enabling for allied capital. It recommends:
- Trusted capital accreditation and fast track. Modelled on the US’s Trusted Capital Marketplace and the US Treasury’s fast track pilot for ally / partner investors, the report recommends creating a UK accreditation for vetted domestic / allied investors, with fast-track case handling and dedicated case managers. A curated marketplace would connect accredited capital with priority UK sectors and capabilities.
- Proportionality and targeting. In line with US best practice, the UK should reduce NSIA red tape for low risk transactions but maintain strong scrutiny where national security risks are real. Reforms should streamline the regime to focus on genuinely sensitive targets (the government’s current reform proposals are very limited).
- Parliamentary accountability. Informed by the US, the UK should amend the NSIA to enable parliamentary scrutiny of the NSIA’s operation and outcomes. We note that this has long been called for.
- Closer linkage to broader economic security policy. Reflecting the alignment achieved by the US’s industrial policy and EU’s sectoral priorities, NSIA decisions should take into account sovereign capabilities priorities and supply chain objectives published as part of the whole of government approach.
The EU’s revised foreign investment screening regulation is currently in the legislative process, aimed at creating more consistency across the national-level FDI regimes (all 27 Member States have FDI regimes in force or in the pipeline). The next round of negotiations about the degree of harmonisation and EU-level oversight takes place in early December between the Commission, Member States and European Parliament. These regimes are typically not focused on enabling investment from allies, as the Committee has suggested for the UK. Intra-EU investment has been blocked in some cases (e.g., Hungary recently blocked the acquisition of a Hungarian dairy business by a Greek dairy business on food security grounds).
Potential impact on UK investment screening
The government is under no obligation to act on the committee’s recommendations. But if implemented, the recommended NSIA reforms would be significant:
- Only a small fraction of NSIA-notified deals raise security issues (of 1,143 NSIA notifications in the last reporting year, only 4.5% were called-in for scrutiny and only one was blocked, as we reported). A faster lane for accredited “trusted” investors (called for by a number of industry bodies) and a trusted capital market place would reduce red tape but also facilitate investment into the UK.
- Currently, NSIA assessment of national security is conducted on a case-by-case basis with minimal transparency of the evaluation criteria. An overarching economic security doctrine with clear priorities and objectives would improve predictability and consistency. This would, in turn, increase understanding of deal risk.
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