This Client Memorandum is available in Spanish here.
On Friday, October 24, 2025, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) added Colombian President Gustavo Francisco Petro Urrego (“Gustavo Petro”) to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (“SDN List”) pursuant to counternarcotics-related authorities.[1] OFAC noted that, under Petro’s leadership, Colombia “remains the world’s top producer and exporter of cocaine” and stated that his policies “have led to record highs of coca cultivation and cocaine production.” OFAC also designated Petro’s “support network,” – including his wife, his son, and a “close associate” who serves as the Minister of the Interior – under the same authorities.[2]
U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent stated that these designations are a “strong action to protect our nation and make clear that we will not tolerate the trafficking of drugs into our nation.” These designations were taken in parallel with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s decision not to certify Colombia’s counternarcotics efforts, with Secretary Rubio noting that this decision was “not a reflection on these institutions but rather the failures and incompetence of Gustavo Petro and his inner circle.”[3]
As a result of these designations, U.S. persons are generally prohibited from all dealings with the designated persons (or any entities that they own directly or indirectly 50% or more), and any property and interests in property of such persons that come within the United States or within the possession or control of U.S. persons must be blocked and reported to OFAC. Non-U.S. person dealings with these persons that involve a U.S. nexus are also generally prohibited.
Key Compliance Considerations
The designation of Colombia’s President and its Minister of the Interior increases sanctions-related risks in dealing with the Government of Colombia, particularly the Ministry of the Interior.
Generally, OFAC’s 50% rule applies to “ownership and not to control” and, as such, governmental agencies are not considered to automatically be blocked even if they are led or controlled by sanctioned persons.[4] OFAC nonetheless states that “persons should be cautious in dealing with [] a non-blocked entity” that “one or more blocked persons may control” to “ensure that they are not, for example, dealing with a blocked person representing the non-blocked entity, such as entering into a contract that is signed by a blocked person.”
While OFAC has not issued guidance on the designation of a government official in the context of this sanctions program, in other sanctions programs OFAC noted that the designation of a government official does not mean that the government itself is blocked. For example, in the context of the Venezuela sanctions program and before OFAC blocked the property of the Government of Venezuela, OFAC issued guidance by way of FAQ that the “designation of an official of the Government of Venezuela does not mean that the government itself is also blocked. The prohibitions apply to transactions or dealings only with the individuals and entities whose property and interests in property are blocked.”[5] In the Hong-Kong related sanctions program, OFAC notes that the “designation of an official of the Government of the HKSAR does not itself block the HKSAR government or any government agency where the SDN is an official or otherwise exercises control. Accordingly, engaging in a routine interaction with an agency in which an SDN is an official, but which does not involve the SDN directly or indirectly, is not prohibited.”[6] However, OFAC has noted in the Hong Kong program that “U.S. persons should be cautious in dealings with [] government agencies in which an SDN is an official to ensure that they are not engaged in transactions or dealings, directly or indirectly, with an SDN (e.g., by entering into contracts that are signed by an SDN, entering into negotiations with an SDN, or processing transactions, directly or indirectly, on behalf of the SDN)[.] However, U.S. persons may, for example, enter into HKSAR government contracts signed by a non-SDN official of the HKSAR to whom the HKSAR government has delegated the authority to enter such contracts.”[7]
Given this guidance in other sanctions programs, it does not appear that OFAC will treat the Government of Colombia and the Ministry of the Interior as blocked. However, U.S. persons should exercise enhanced diligence in any dealings with the Government of Colombia, particularly the Ministry of the Interior.
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[1] U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury Sanctions Colombian President Gustavo Petro and His Support Network (Oct. 25, 2025), available here. These designations were made pursuant to Executive Order 14059, which authorizes sanctions on foreign persons determined to have engaged in, or to have materially contributed to, the international proliferation of illicit drugs or their means of production, as well as on those who provide financial, material, or technological support for such activity.
[2] OFAC made specific findings regarding each of these SDNs. OFAC noted that Petro’s wife and First Lady, Verónica del Socorro Alcocer Garcia, was “unconstitutionally appointed by Gustavo Petro to serve as an ambassador ‘on a special mission.’” OFAC noted that Petro’s eldest son, Nicolás Fernando Petro Burgos, had been “arrested in Colombia for money laundering and illicit enrichment over allegations that he funneled money received from drug traffickers into Gustavo Petro’s ‘total peace’ efforts and election campaign.” OFAC noted that Petro’s “close associate,” Armando Alberto Benedetti Villaneda, had “been appointed to multiple high-ranking positions within the Colombian government by Gustavo Petro.” Since February 2025, Benedetti has served as Minister of the Interior.
[3] U.S. Department of State, U.S. Decision Not to Certify Colombia’s Counternarcotics Efforts and Sanctions Actions Against Colombian Officials Involved in Global Illicit Drug Trade (Oct. 25, 2025), available here. In September 2025, President Donald Trump issued a Presidential Determination including Colombia on the list of countries identified as “major drug transit or major illicit drug producing countries” and he noted that the “failure of Colombia to meet its drug control obligations over the past year rests solely with its political leadership.” U.S. Department of State, Presidential Determination on Major Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2026 (Sep. 15, 2025), available here.
[4] OFAC FAQ 398.
[5] OFAC FAQ 505.
[6] OFAC FAQ 840; see also OFAC FAQ 285 (rescinded Burma sanctions FAQ) (a “government ministry is not blocked solely because the minister heading it is an SDN. U.S. persons should, however, be cautious in dealings with the ministry to ensure that they are not providing funds, goods, or services to the SDN; for example, by entering into any contracts that are signed by the SDN.”)
[7] OFAC FAQ 840.
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