On November 16, 2026, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) unsealed an indictment in the Northern District of Georgia charging Ada Evila Serrano Nuñez (“Serrano”), the former Consul General of the Honduran Consulate in Atlanta, with violating the Foreign Extortion Prevention Act (“FEPA”), conspiracy to violate FEPA and conspiracy to commit money laundering.[1] The indictment alleges that Serrano demanded and received cash bribes from a Tennessee-based company in exchange for allowing the company’s clients to access appointments for services at the consulate.[2] Three others—Serrano’s two adult sons and a former consulate employee—were arrested on a related criminal complaint charging them with conspiracy to violate FEPA.

The case is the first prosecution ever brought under FEPA, which Congress enacted in December 2023 as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 and later amended in July 2024.[3] As recently as December 2025, the DOJ reported to Congress that it had not yet announced any FEPA prosecutions because the related investigations are “time intensive and require extensive investigation before cases are ready for prosecution.”[4] Although the DOJ has previously charged foreign officials who have engaged in the solicitation and receipt of bribes under other statutes,[5] the Serrano charges nonetheless mark a significant milestone in the DOJ’s effort to police the demand side of foreign bribery and signal that the DOJ is prepared to use FEPA as an additional tool in pursuing corrupt foreign officials operating on U.S. soil or otherwise subject to U.S. jurisdiction.

FEPA Overview

For more than four decades, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) has prohibited the offer or payment of bribes to foreign officials to assist in obtaining or retaining business—so-called “supply-side” or active bribery. But until 2023, there was no federal analogue to the FCPA that covered foreign officials who solicit or receive such payments.[6] On December 14, 2023, Congress passed FEPA. The act prohibits a foreign official from corruptly demanding, seeking, receiving, accepting or agreeing to receive or accept, directly or indirectly, anything of value in exchange for an improper business advantage.[7] FEPA is now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1352, and violations carry penalties of up to 15 years’ imprisonment and fines of up to $250,000 or three times the value of the bribe.[8]

FEPA borrows the FCPA’s jurisdictional framework, covering demands made of issuers of U.S. securities and U.S. “domestic concerns.”[9] Where demands are made of individuals or entities that are neither issuers of U.S. securities nor domestic concerns, FEPA only applies if the foreign official is in U.S. territory.[10] The official conduct a bribe may be sought in exchange for includes any “act or decision” of the official in an “official capacity,” mirroring the language in the FCPA.[11]

The Serrano Indictment

According to the DOJ, Serrano served as Consul General of the Honduran Consulate in Atlanta from July 2022 through March 2026.[12] The consulate provides Honduran citizens in the United States with passports, travel documents, notary services and civil records.[13] A Tennessee-based company (the “Consular Services Company”) scheduled consulate appointments for its clients and transported them to and from the consulate.[14]

According to the indictment, beginning in or around July 2023—roughly a year after Serrano became Consul General—Serrano instructed a consulate security guard to require the Consular Services Company’s owner and an employee to pay a bribe for each person the company transported to the consulate.[15] The company generally charged each client approximately $300, an amount that covered both transportation and the bribe.[16] In exchange, Serrano allegedly gave the company’s clients access to appointments they otherwise would have been denied under the consulate’s limited daily appointment system.[17] According to prosecutors, Serrano and her coconspirators “would and did demand, seek, receive, and accept bribes, directly and indirectly . . . in connection with obtaining and retaining business for [the] Consular Service Company, including [by] authorizing, facilitating, and prioritizing access to appointments for Consular Services Company’s clients.”[18]

Notably, although the indictment describes a scheme dating to July 2023, the conduct charged under FEPA begins in or around August 2024—shortly after Congress made certain amendments to the statute—and continues through March 2026.[19]

Serrano allegedly directed consulate staff, including Mario Antonio Castellanos Velasquez (“Castellanos”), a former consulate employee who is a dual U.S.-Honduran citizen and whom the indictment also describes as a “foreign official,” to coordinate with the Consular Services Company and ensure that clients who had paid were admitted.[20] According to the indictment, the security guard collected the bribes from July 2023 through December 2024, and then Castellanos took over collection from January 2025 through March 2026.[21]

To conceal the corrupt payments, from July 2023 through at least December 2024, Serrano allegedly directed that most of the cash be delivered by Castellanos to her sons, Luis Euceda Serrano and Angel Euceda Serrano.[22] The two allegedly deposited the funds into their personal bank accounts in the Northern District of Georgia in amounts between $100 and $6,000 at a time.[23] On a few occasions in 2024, cash was allegedly delivered directly to Serrano.[24] In total, over nearly three years, Serrano allegedly collected more than $375,000 in bribes.[25]

The DOJ further alleges that Serrano took steps to avoid detection, including using encrypted messaging applications and, beginning in or around October 2023, limiting the Consular Services Company’s clients to a maximum of 15 appointments per day.[26] In one meeting, she allegedly warned her sons and a staff member: “[T]here might be cameras. I’m scared, please be careful. . . . I want to check under my desk because that’s where they put the microphones.”[27]

A grand jury in Atlanta returned the sealed indictment against Serrano in September 2026, and authorities arrested her on November 15, 2026.[28] Castellanos and Serrano’s two sons were arrested the same day and charged in a complaint with conspiracy to violate FEPA based on the same course of conduct detailed in Serrano’s indictment.[29] Unlike Serrano, the three are not charged with substantive FEPA violations or money laundering conspiracy.[30] It is unclear whether a court would uphold the charges against Serrano’s sons and Castellanos. FEPA prohibits the solicitation of bribes by foreign officials, but only Castellanos is alleged to have been a “foreign official” as defined in FEPA.[31] Federal decisions interpreting the FCPA have held that individuals who cannot be charged with violations of the FCPA itself similarly cannot be charged with conspiracy to violate the FCPA.[32] Without any allegation that Serrano’s sons are foreign officials who have violated FEPA, the complaint as filed raises legal questions.  Should the DOJ proceed to indict the sons based on the same FEPA conspiracy charge, such indictment may be subject to legal challenge.

Key Takeaways

  • Charging choices around FEPA’s effective date. Although the indictment describes conduct dating back to July 2023, the DOJ describes the FEPA conduct as beginning in August 2024, after the July 2024 amendments took effect, while the money laundering allegations reach back to July 2023.[33] This suggests prosecutors were careful about retroactivity and relied on the money laundering statutes for earlier conduct. Defendants in future cases can be expected to test the temporal reach of the original and amended versions of the statute.
  • The payor is treated as the victim. The Consular Services Company, whose owner is a U.S. citizen, allegedly paid the bribes and passed their cost on to its clients, yet neither the company nor its personnel have been charged. The DOJ instead casts the company as the target of extortion while remaining silent as to whether the Consular Services Company self-reported or cooperated with the DOJ in its investigation.[34] Those considerations may have been a factor in deciding not to prosecute the company or its personnel. Companies should not interpret this as a safe harbor. A U.S. company that pays a bribe demanded by a foreign official, whether inside or outside the United States, may still face FCPA prosecution, and how the DOJ treats companies that report demands promptly—as opposed to paying them for an extended period—remains an open question.
  • Enforcement capacity persists despite DOJ attrition. The Serrano charges come at a time of significant contraction in the DOJ’s foreign bribery resources. According to the DOJ, the Fraud Section’s FCPA Unit shrank from 32 prosecutors in 2024 to 22 in 2025, down from 39 prosecutors in 2021—and there have been several reports of additional departures in 2026.[35] The FBI’s investigative infrastructure, however, appears to remain active, as evidenced by the DOJ crediting the FBI’s International Corruption Unit with assisting the Atlanta Field Office in this investigation.[36] Companies should not read reduced headcount at the DOJ to mean reduced risk of investigation or prosecution.
  • Wholly or largely domestic companies must still take precautions. The Consular Services Company’s activity here appears to be wholly domestic, as it arranged for appointments at and travel to the consulate for Honduran citizens in the United States. Even companies that operate wholly or largely within the United States may find themselves interacting with foreign officials who are on U.S. soil. Companies that do not view themselves as global should nonetheless ensure that their compliance programs account for interactions with foreign officials in the United States, should such interactions be reasonably foreseeable.
  • “Business” is construed broadly. The quid pro quo here was routine access to consular appointments for a small transportation and scheduling business, not a government contract, approval or authorization. The DOJ’s theory that prioritized access to routine government services constitutes “obtaining or retaining business” suggests that FEPA, like the FCPA, will be construed broadly to reach everyday demands, including for discretionary permits, licenses, inspections or—as was the case here—appointments.
  • FEPA supplements existing tools. The DOJ has long charged foreign officials in bribery schemes under money laundering and related statutes, and the Serrano indictment pairs FEPA with a money laundering conspiracy count. We expect FEPA to continue to be charged together with these statutes rather than in their place.
  • Cooperation from the foreign government. Honduras’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that Serrano had been administratively removed on March 24, 2026: “[T]hrough Agreement No. 489-SRH-2026, issued on March 24, 2026, the current government administration ordered the cancellation of [her] appointment and all agreements issued in her favor, in the context of the administrative transition.”[37] The Honduran Ministry of Foreign Affairs further announced internal audits and its willingness to cooperate with U.S. authorities.[38] The DOJ’s first case thus appears to involve a former official whose government did not object to the prosecution. Despite this stated willingness to cooperate, the DOJ’s press release is silent as to whether the Honduran government provided any assistance in the investigation.[39] This is notable because DOJ press releases announcing FCPA indictments often identify the role foreign governments played in investigating the bribery. While U.S. Attorney Theodore S. Hertzberg of the Northern District of Georgia warned that his office “will vigorously prosecute any bribery occurring in our district, no matter how highly placed the criminal is,” cases against sitting officials, or officials of less cooperative governments, may raise questions of immunity and diplomacy.[40]

Conclusion

The Serrano indictment moves FEPA from a statute on the books to an active enforcement tool. While the case involves relatively straightforward allegations—a foreign official in the United States allegedly demanding cash from a U.S. company—it demonstrates the DOJ’s willingness to charge foreign officials directly, notwithstanding the diplomatic sensitivities such prosecutions may raise. Companies that interact with foreign officials should consider reviewing their anti-corruption policies, training and third-party due diligence to address demands for improper payments, including by establishing clear procedures for employees to report such demands to legal and compliance personnel. We will continue to monitor how the DOJ enforces FEPA, including how it coordinates FEPA prosecutions with its FCPA enforcement program, how it treats companies that self-report or cooperate regarding solicitations by foreign officials, and whether it persists in charging non-officials with conspiring to violate FEPA or such charges are challenged.

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[1] Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Former Honduran Consul General Charged and 3 Others Arrested in Alleged Bribery and Money Laundering Scheme (Nov. 16, 2026), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-honduran-consul-general-charged-and-3-others-arrested-alleged-bribery-and-money [hereinafter, “DOJ Serrano Release”].

[2] United States v. Serrano Nuñez, No. 1:26CR0407 Indictment ¶¶ 13–15 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 1, 2026), https://assets.law360news.com/2550000/2550737/indictment%20copy.pdf [hereinafter, “Indictment”].

[3] See Mark Mendelsohn and Ben Klein, Congress Quietly Amends FEPA: What Cos. Should Do Now, Law360 (July 26, 2024), https://www.paulweiss.com/insights/publications/mark-mendelsohn-and-benjamin-klein-co-author-law360-expert-analysis-on-fepa-revisions; see also DOJ Serrano Release; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, Pub. L. No. 118-31, § 5101, 137 Stat. 931 (2023); 170 Cong. Rec. H4656–4658 (2024) (statement of Rep. Issa), https://www.congress.gov/118/crec/2024/07/22/170/118/CREC-2024-07-22-pt1-PgH4656-2.pdf.

[4] Letters, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Off. of Legis. Affs., FEPA Report (Dec. 22, 2025), https://www.justice.gov/criminal/media/1422721/dl?inline.

[5] See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, No. 13-cr-901 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2013) (money laundering and Travel Act charges); United States v. Siriwan, No. 09-cr-81 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2015) (money laundering and transporting funds to promote unlawful activity charges).

[6] See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 et seq.

[7] 18 U.S.C. § 1352(b)(1); see also Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, Congress Passes Foreign Extortion Prevention Act, Expanding Federal Criminal Liability to Foreign Officials (Dec. 22, 2023), https://www.paulweiss.com/insights/client-memos/congress-passes-foreign-extortion-prevention-act-expanding-federal-criminal-liability-to-foreign-officials.

[8] 18 U.S.C. § 1352(b)(2).

[9] 18 U.S.C. § 1352(b)(1).

[10] Id.

[11] Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1352(b)(1)(B) with 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(1)(A).

[12] DOJ Serrano Release.

[13] Indictment ¶ 11.

[14] Id. ¶ 6.

[15] Id. ¶¶ 13-15.

[16] Id. ¶ 14.

[17] Id. ¶ 15.

[18] Id. ¶ 24(a).

[19] Id. ¶¶ 18, 22.

[20] DOJ Serrano Release; Indictment ¶ 5.

[21] Indictment ¶¶ 13, 17–18.

[22] Id. ¶ 19.

[23] Id.

[24] Id. ¶ 20.

[25] DOJ Serrano Release.

[26] Indictment ¶¶ 16, 24(d).

[27] Indictment ¶ 16(b).

[28] DOJ Serrano Release.

[29] Id.; United States v. Castellanos Velazquez, No. 1:26-MJ-1215 Complaint ¶ 28 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 15, 2026) [hereinafter, “Complaint”].

[30] See generally Complaint.

[31] See generally Complaint; Indictment.

[32] See United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Hoskins, 902 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 2018).

[33] DOJ Serrano Release; Indictment ¶ 29.

[34] DOJ Serrano Release.

[35] Compare U.S. Dep’t of Just., Fraud Section Year in Review 2024 at 12 (Jan. 2025), justice.gov/criminal/media/1385111/dl, with U.S. Dep’t of Just., Fraud Section Year in Review 2025 at 11 (Jan. 2026), justice.gov/criminal/media/1425226/dl and U.S. Dep’t of Just., Fraud Section Year in Review 2021 at 9 (Feb. 2022), https://www.justice.gov/d9/fieldable-panel-panes/basic-panes/attachments/2022/02/14/frd-2021-yir-final.pdf. See also “FCPA Unit loses star trio as ranks thin,” GIR (June 17, 2026), https://globalinvestigationsreview.com/just-anti-corruption/article/fcpa-unit-loses-star-trio-ranks-thin; “FCPA Unit prosecutor leaves for in-house role,” GIR (Nov. 17, 2026), https://globalinvestigationsreview.com/just-anti-corruption/article/fcpa-unit-prosecutor-leaves-in-house-role.

[36] DOJ Serrano Release.

[37] Cancillería de Honduras Reafirma Su Compromiso con la Transparencia, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores y Cooperación Internacional (Nov. 2026), https://sreci.gob.hn/noticia/cancilleria-de-honduras-reafirma-su-compromiso-con-la-transparencia-ante-investigacion-estadounidense-contra-exfuncionaria-consular/.

[38] Id.

[39] DOJ Serrano Release.

[40] Id.