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# ISS Releases 2026 Benchmark Policy Updates

Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) last week issued its benchmark [voting policy updates](#) for 2026. The updates show a pullback in blanket support for environmental and social (“E&S”) shareholder proposals and a focus on aligning executive pay with long-term company performance. Coming amid continued regulatory pressure on proxy advisors, the updates reflect a broader investor focus on granting companies greater deference in their approach to E&S issues and on ensuring core governance policies, including executive compensation, incentivize long-term value creation for shareholders. The 2026 benchmark policies will apply to shareholder meetings on or after February 1, 2026.

Key U.S. policy updates are summarized below:

- [E&S shareholder proposal updates](#) – ISS will now recommend on a case-by-case basis on four categories of E&S shareholder proposals (climate change/greenhouse gas emissions; diversity; human rights; and political contributions), taking into account factors such as company disclosures and policies and whether the company has faced significant controversies associated with such E&S issues. ISS’s prior policy was to generally recommend “for” such proposals.
- [Executive compensation updates](#)
  - ◆ [Board responsiveness to low say-on-pay support](#) – In recognition of the impact of the SEC’s guidance on 13D/G eligibility on the availability of shareholder feedback, ISS has amended its board responsiveness policy in situations where a company’s say-on-pay vote receives approval by less than 70% of votes cast, to focus on whether a company’s responsive actions serve shareholder interests broadly (as opposed to addressing specific shareholder input).
  - ◆ [Pay-for-performance evaluation](#) – To emphasize “sustained value creation” and smooth out short-term or one-time impacts in its pay-for-performance evaluations, ISS has extended the period over which it will evaluate (i) TSR and peer group CEO pay/company performance to five years (instead of three years) and (ii) the multiple of the CEO’s total pay relative to the peer group median over one- and three-year periods (instead of the most recent fiscal year). Similarly, ISS has added more flexibility to its pay-for-performance qualitative review of the equity pay mix, so that time-based equity awards with extended time horizons will be viewed positively and has clarified that realized pay may be considered along with realizable and granted pay in the review.
  - ◆ [Equity plan scorecard](#) – ISS has amended its Equity Plan Scorecard to add a new factor that assesses whether a plan in which non-employee directors participate discloses cash-denominated award limits. ISS has also introduced a new negative overriding factor where an equity plan proposal that otherwise receives a passing score under the Equity Plan Scorecard will receive an “against” recommendation for lack of sufficient positive plan features.
  - ◆ [High non-employee director pay](#) – ISS’s policy to recommend against directors for setting excessive or otherwise problematic non-employee director pay will now apply if there is a pattern across non-consecutive, multiple years or even in the first year, if the pay is particularly egregious. The prior policy required two consecutive years of excessive director pay to be triggered.

### ■ Other governance updates

- ◆ Unequal voting rights – ISS has clarified that its policy to recommend against directors at a company with an unequal voting structure applies regardless of whether the high-vote shares are classified as common or preferred. The current policy only refers to high-vote common stock. The updates also apply to ISS’s policy to recommend against proposals to add high-vote stock. Convertible preferred shares that vote on an “as-converted” basis, and super-voting preferred stock that is limited in duration/applicability (e.g., preferred stock issued to overcome low voter turnout on a non-controversial item and with mirrored voting), are acceptable exceptions.

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This memorandum is not intended to provide legal advice, and no legal or business decision should be based on its content. Questions concerning issues addressed in this memorandum should be directed to:

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